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Abstract 
Implicit contracts are “invisible handshakes” that are not legally binding but are grounded in 
mutual understanding between the parties of what they expect from each other. These con-
tracts are very common both within the firm (e.g. between managers and employees) and in 
business relationships (e.g. between a firm and its suppliers). Typically, implicit contracts 
arise in relationships that are in some way open-ended. An extensive literature has showed 
that implicit contracts allow firms to create value by encouraging relationship-specific invest-
ment and motivating effort by stakeholders. This chapter focuses on how sustainability satis-
fies existing implicit contracts (including a broad social contract with society at large) and fa-
cilitates a firm in entering new implicit contracts by improving its trustworthiness. I argue that 
the adoption of sustainability is directly related to industry- and firm-level variables that make 
implicit contracts important to a firm’s strategies, and inversely related to the strength of 
overriding factors that make a firm trustworthy. Based on this reasoning, I analyse four areas 
in which rates of sustainability adoption can vary according to the importance of implicit con-
tracts. 








Stakeholder theory has frequently advanced the view that a firm is a nexus of explicit and im-
plicit claims, where explicit claims consist in laws and explicit contracts, while implicit claims 
stem from implicit contracts between the firm and stakeholders (Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & 
Pitelis, 2012). The defining characteristic of implicit contracts is that they cannot be enforced 
in courts (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). An implication of this view is to present pro-social action 
by firms as fulfilling implicit contracts with stakeholders, including a broad social contract with 
society at large, which grants firms access to natural, social, or political resources.  
The literature has showed that implicit contracts allow firms to create value, by enabling 
relationship-specific investment and effort by stakeholders (Klein et al., 2012). However, firms 
need to be trustworthy to enter and maintain implicit contracts (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). 
Stakeholders expect to appropriate part of the rents generated by implicit contracts; so, stake-
holders are interested to contribute to the relationship as long as they trust the firm to adhere to 
the agreement. In this chapter, I show that trustworthiness has two consequences for sustaina-
bility. First, being socially and environmentally sustainable facilitates a firm in entering implicit 
contracts by improving its trustworthiness. Second, sustainability can be superseded by alter-
native ways of demonstrating trustworthiness in implicit contracts, leading certain firms to un-
derinvest in their social and environmental efforts. 
In developing this position, I try to move beyond the economic interpretation of implicit 
contracts, which reduces the trustworthiness of the firm to the expectation that it will be profit-
able for the firm to honour the contract. In this interpretation, stakeholders have calculative 
trust (Williamson, 1993), i.e., a rational assessment of the conditions that may drive the firm to 
fulfil promises. This interpretation is too narrow, because trust research points at other types of 
trust that are founded on personal ties and social rules, rather than calculation (Fulmer & 
Gelfand, 2012). Moreover, calculative trust is actually more typical of arm’s-length relation-
ships than the open-ended relationships that usually harbour implicit contracts (Poppo, Zhou, 
& Li, 2016). While the theoretical premises of the economic interpretation of implicit contracts 
and the trust literature are often at odds, I try to show that these views can be usefully combined. 
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By drawing from both, I examine the reasons why stakeholders expect a firm to honour agree-
ments and how sustainability improves trustworthiness of firms.  
The chapter also tries to contribute to our understanding of why firms and industries vary 
in their commitment to sustainability. Under the premise that sustainability is costly, because it 
absorbs resources that could serve other purposes, the degree of adoption of sustainability 
should be directly related to industry- and firm-level variables that make implicit contracts im-
portant to a firm’s strategies, and inversely related to the strength of overriding factors that 
make a firm trustworthy in implicit contracts. Based on this reasoning, I analyse four areas in 
which rates of sustainability adoption should be higher or lower.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the economic 
interpretation of implicit contracts and explain how the notion of trustworthiness used in this 
interpretation can be enriched by a realistic consideration of the sources of trust identified in 
the literature. In section 3, I discuss the place of implicit contracts within stakeholder theory 
and how firms can use sustainability to increase their trustworthiness and, as a consequence, 
facilitate implicit contracts. In section 4, I identify and examine the areas in which the implicit-
contract perspective explains variance in sustainability adoption. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Implicit contracts and trustworthiness 
Implicit contracts have been defined as “arrangements that are not legally binding but that give 
both sides incentives to maintain the relationship” (Okun, 1981). These contracts are “invisible 
handshakes” that are grounded in mutual understanding between the parties of what they expect 
from each other. Implicit contracts are very common both within the firm (e.g. between man-
agers and employees) and in business relationships (e.g. between a firm and its suppliers). Typ-
ically, implicit contracts arise in relationships that are in some way open-ended, rather than in 
spot-market exchanges. Open-ended relationships – that is, continued or repeated – are exposed 
to future contingencies that may change the payoffs of the parties and impinge on their willing-
ness to honour obligations. Complete contracting of future contingencies, which are often hard 
to describe in advance, is notoriously costly. This is where implicit contracts offer a flexible 
and convenient alternative for governing the relationship. 
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Macaulay (1963) was the first to present anedoctical evidence of the pervasiveness of in-
formal and good-faith agreements in business. The widespread acceptance of implicit contracts 
can be puzzling when considering that they cannot be enforced in courts (Cornell & Shapiro, 
1987). Implicit contracts are essentially promises: each party must trust the other to deliver on 
the contract without being legally required to do so. Godley (2013) reports how U.S. manufac-
turer Singer created a market for domestic sewing machines in Europe at the end of the 19th 
century by promising customers an after-sale service that was not written in a formal product 
warranty. Singer did not want to be legally forced to provide assistance to European customers 
if the market failed to develop. Therefore, Singer needed to make after-sale service contingent 
on a future state (achieving a sufficient number of customers), which, however, was difficult to 
contract. Merely promising to provide service bypassed the problem. The implicit service con-
tract was grounded in the customer’s general understanding that Singer was interested in word-
of-mouth publicity and in growing its business. A part of Singer’s success was due to its inno-
vative selling system, in which sales staff visited households, establishing face-to-face relation-
ships with customers and providing both the pre-sale demonstration and the after-sale service. 
The other part was that customers were allowed to pay in instalments, which were collected by 
the sales staff, giving customers some bargaining power, since they could block payments if 
the machines were not serviced.  
This example shows that implicit contracts do not have to be tacit. Verbal promises or 
actual handshakes are implicit contracts, because they do no create legally enforceable obliga-
tions. This is why some speak of ‘self-enforcing contracts’ (Telser, 1980), emphasizing that 
parties enforce the contract themselves without going to courts, or ‘relational contracts’ (Baker 
et al., 2002), emphasizing that the contract rests on a protracted relationship between the parties. 
The economic interpretation of implicit contracts has been that parties honour the terms of 
the agreement as long as it is beneficial for them to do so (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). First, 
fulfilling the promises keeps a productive relationship alive. Second, those who fulfil promises 
develop a reputation for trustworthiness and are able to enter new implicit contracts, with the 
same party or others (Kreps, 1990). This logic can be modelled as a repeated cooperative game 
in which the implicit contract yields streams of income for the parties, originating from on-
going or future business. The stream defines the value of the relationship. At each stage of the 
game, parties will deliver on the implicit contract if their respective value of the relationship is 
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larger than their immediate payoffs of reneging on it. The model has many testable implications, 
for example that large firms are more likely than small firms to adhere to implicit contracts, 
because the former have bigger streams of income to lose if they harm their own reputation 
(Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978).  
The economic interpretation reduces the trustworthiness of a party to the expectation that 
the party will find advantageous to honour the contract. In the trust literature, this expectation 
is called calculative trust (Williamson, 1993), deterrence-based trust (Rousseau et al., 1998), 
or cognitive trust (McAllister, 1995). However, decades of trust research indicate that other 
types of trust exist which are not founded on calculation but on personal ties and social rules 
(Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). So-called affective trust (McAllister, 1995) stems from the positive 
emotions of the trustor generated by the relationship with the trustee; this type of trust makes 
the trustor especially prone to engage in relationships when control systems (such as legal en-
forcement) are absent (Johnson & Grayson, 2005). Affective trust develops over time and so is 
likely to affect the long-term relationships that harbour implicit contracts. In fact, calculative 
trust is more typical of short-term or exchange-oriented transactions (Poppo et al., 2016). 
Gibbons & Henderson (2012) suggest that implicit contracts may also be supported by 
social trust, which is the propensity to trust others when individuals share a culture or partici-
pate in certain institutions. In an atmosphere of social trust, implicit contracts are facilitated by 
a sense of mutual respect and a consensus on principles of fair play. Social trust might explain 
why firms from some countries (such as Germany and Japan) find it easier to build long-term 
relationships with stakeholders (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
Finally, it is implausible that parties always have detailed information about how valuable 
the relationship is to the other party (Halac, 2012). The value of the relationship depends on 
factors that can be largely unknown, such as the other party’s plans, business opportunities, and 
whether the reputation costs of reneging on the contract are large enough to prevent exit. For 
example, workers may find it difficult to predict whether the employer, in face of cost pressures, 
will find it convenient to honour implicit contracts with the local community or shut the factory 
down and offshore production. Moreover, the value of the relationship is sensitive to discount 
rates (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012): the other party might be a ‘patient’ type (low discount 
rate), who is interested in staying on the market and entering new implicit contracts in the fu-
ture, or an ‘impatient’ type (high discount rate), who looks for a quick payoff and is open to 
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short-term opportunistic behaviour. The type of the party is hard to assess, especially at the 
beginning of the relationship. The general lack of information on the value of the relationship 
for the other party suggests that non-calculative forms of trust, involving some ‘leap of faith’ 
(Möllering, 2001), are often needed to initiate and uphold implicit contracts. 
 
2.2. Benefits of implicit contracts in relationships with stakeholders  
Implicit contracts allow firms to engage in value-creating relationships (with employees, sup-
pliers, customers, local communities, public authorities, and other stakeholders) that would be 
less efficient if governed through market transactions or formal long-term agreements. A first 
benefit of implicit contracts is to encourage relationship-specific investments by stakeholders 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998; Klein et al., 1978). An investment is relationship-specific when the stake-
holder cannot redeploy it to an alternative use without bearing substantial costs (Williamson, 
1985). A typical example is an employee who learns skills that are tailored to the processes of 
the firm. 
Relationship-specific investments create rents, because specialized resources are usually 
more productive than generic resources. After stakeholders make the investment, the firm may 
recur to opportunism to appropriate the whole rent, because stakeholders cannot threaten to exit 
the relationship without losing the investment. In principle, explicit contracts could state how 
the rent is to be divided between the parties, but they are inferior to implicit contracts when the 
conditions to be specified are too complex. For example, the employee who learns specialized 
skills needs to be assured that the firm will not lay her off, as long as she does a good job, but 
what constitutes a ‘good job’ is generally too nebulous and state-contingent to be written down 
in an explicit contract (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). Implicit contracts allow parties to leave these 
terms unspecified and use mutual understanding and direct knowledge of the situation to estab-
lish whether or to which extent the agreement is being respected. Additionally, implicit con-
tracts give parties the flexibility to adjust their conceptions of appropriate execution in response 
to change in relevant circumstances (Uzzi, 1997). 
Second, implicit contracts can be used to elicit stakeholder effort when the required actions 
cannot be specified ex ante, or even verified ex post. In the Toyota production system, workers 
are expected to identify quality issues and pull an andon cord to ask for real-time help, and if 
necessary, to pull the cord twice to stop the production line. It is not possible to specify exactly 
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the cases in which the cord must be pulled; the system depends on the workers’ ability to eval-
uate when an issue is serious enough to require intervention (Helper & Henderson, 2014). Re-
latedly, the firm cannot reward workers who pull the cord with monetary incentives, which 
might lead to abuses. Instead, the system is based on an implicit contract in which the firm asks 
workers to take responsibility for quality and reward them with lifetime employment. Here 
relationship-specific investments are absent. The implicit contract aims at motivating stake-
holders to situationally complex behaviour that rests on tacit knowledge or expert judgement. 
These contracts may arise in any relationship in which parties interact repeatedly, develop com-
mon understandings and expect each other to act according to shared priorities (Poppo et al., 
2016; Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza, 2004). 
A third benefit of implicit contracts is to obtain consent to a firm’s activities by local com-
munities or broader society. The implicit contracts that firms agree with these stakeholders are 
“social contracts”. These real-world agreements should not be confused with the hypothetical 
social contracts that political theorists devise to provide rational justification for social institu-
tions (Demuijnck & Fasterling, 2016). Real-world or “extant” (Dunfee, 1991) social contracts 
reflect incompleteness of the law, which cannot anticipate all the ways in which firms may have 
an impact on society (Regan, 1998). Even when public regulation of certain activities is possible 
in principle, it may be more socially efficient to grant firms leeway in how they conduct their 
business, due to costs of specifying, monitoring, and enforcing complex rules. This leeway is 
granted under the common understanding that the local community, or society at large, consent 
to the activities of the firm if they deliver desirable societal outcomes (Morrison, 2014). These 
outcomes may consist in social welfare creation (including prevention of negative externalities) 
or in the conformity of a firm’s activities to values and goals of relevant social groups (Dunfee, 
1991). For a firm, consent corresponds to having a “license to operate” (Demuijnck & Faster-
ling, 2016). Firms may enter social contracts by the sheer fact of establishing operations in a 
community and drawing on local resources, or, when looking at society at large, by the sheer 
fact of starting a business (Dunfee, 1991).  
To summarize, many implicit contracts are ways of using trust and relational knowledge 
to promote investments and efforts by stakeholders, or to obtain a license to operate by local 
communities or broader society. Firms that find it difficult to recur to implicit contracts can be 
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at serious competitive disadvantage, because stakeholders will avoid relationship-specific in-
vestments, ask to negotiate costly explicit long-term contracts, or expect to be paid a premium 
for making the investment under the risk of opportunism by the firm. Additionally, these firms 
may face lower effort by stakeholders, or have to pay them higher compensation to obtain the 
same degree of motivation as firms that use implicit contracts. Finally, a firm’s failure to deliver 
on social contracts may result in the loss of its license to operate, i.e. in local resistance, political 
protest, and public opposition to its activities, or introduction of new and costly regulation. 
The literature has emphasized that implicit contracts are difficult to build and maintain and 
that firms are widely heterogeneous in their ability to do so (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). Apart from size and other firm characteristics that impact on the value of the 
relationship (Klein et al., 1978), managers differ in their understanding of which implicit con-
tracts are valuable, their skills in communicating the contracts effectively to stakeholders, and 
their ability to change the terms of the contracts when needed without giving the impression 
they are betraying old agreements (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Gibbons & Henderson, 
2012; Halac, 2012). In the next section, I suggest that firms may also enhance their access to 
implicit contracts by becoming trustworthy in ways that exceed mere calculative trust. In par-
ticular, I will look at how sustainability and pro-social activities in general may influence stake-
holder perceptions of a firm’s purposes and intentions, contributing to the ability of the firm to 
use implicit contracts. 
 
3. The role of sustainability in implicit contracts 
3.1. The firm as a nexus of explicit and implicit claims 
Stakeholder theorists suggest that firms must satisfy both explicit and implicit claims, in con-
trast to the canonical property-rights view that treats shareholders as the only proper claimants 
on the residual income of the firm (Klein et al., 2012). Explicit claims include laws and private 
contracts, which protect the rights of shareholders and other stakeholders, to the extent that they 
trade with the firm. Implicit claims are stakeholder expectations without legal force but with a 
legitimate basis for deserving consideration (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2001; Hill & Jones, 
1992; Kim & Mahoney, 2010; Klein et al., 2012). 
As other propositions of stakeholder theory, the suggestion that firms should meet their 
implicit contracts comes in (at least) two flavours, normative and instrumental (Donaldson & 
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Preston, 1995). Normatively, firms must satisfy implicit claims to compensate stakeholders for 
making value-creating relationship-specific investments under mutually understood anticipa-
tions of reciprocity. For such stakeholders as local communities or society at large, which is the 
claimant for environmental protection or other sustainability issues, social contracts commit 
firms to address societal demands in exchange for access to natural, social, or political resources 
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). Instrumentally, fulfilling implicit claims allows firms to build 
value-creating relationships with stakeholders, as examined in the previous section. Moreover, 
it prevents stakeholders from exiting the relationship, damaging the firm’s reputation by using 
voice, or making their claims explicit (e.g., governments could pass restrictive environmental 
regulation in response to failure by firms to address climate change or pollution issues). 
Low levels of sustainability coincide with an inability by the firm to honour implicit con-
tracts or a failure to address the anticipations of reciprocity by stakeholders who contribute 
investments and effort (Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009). However, it is important to notice 
that sustainability also significantly contribute to the ability of firms to recur to these contracts. 
The critical role of sustainability and pro-social attitudes in implicit contracts becomes clearer 
when acknowledging that these contracts are grounded in types of trust that are not always 
calculative.  
 
3.2. Value of the relationship, benevolence, and integrity  
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) introduced ability, benevolence, and integrity as the three 
main dimensions of the trustworthiness of a referent. Ability consists in the skills that allow a 
referent to perform as promised. Benevolence is the referent’s particularized attachment to the 
trustor, based on specific care and concern that do not necessarily extend to other parties. In-
tegrity is defined as the extent that the referent is honest, fair, or adheres to values approved by 
the trustor. Ability is the ‘can-do’ component of trust; benevolence and integrity define the 
‘will-do’ component that decides whether the referent will fulfil the trustor’s expectation, on 
top of self-interest for doing so (Colquitt et al., 2007). Trust literature generally accepts these 
dimensions as a parsimonious and encompassing set of the relevant features of the trustee 
(Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). 
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Let us assume that stakeholders believe that the firm has the ability to perform as desired. 
Then, by combining the value of the relationship for the firm and will-do trustworthiness at-
tributions, there are at least three reasons why stakeholders could trust the firm to fulfil the 
implicit contract. 
1. It is in the best interest of the firm to honour the contract (the relationship is valuable to 
the firm). 
2. The firm has special care and concern for them (the firm has benevolence). 
3. The firm has promised (the firm has integrity). 
Given certain projected streams of income from its relationship with specific stakeholders 
or with society at large, a firm will honour implicit contracts to the degree that it is patient, 
because low discount rates make continued relationships look larger than immediate payoffs of 
defection. This long-term orientation is strictly associated with adopting a sustainability per-
spective in business (Crilly, 2013). A documented lack of long-term orientation damages a 
firm’s capacity to engage in implicit contracts, because stakeholders will think that the firm 
gives a low value to continued relationships. When in 1984 General Motors (GM) wanted to 
change the union contract to introduce teams and implement Japanese-style lean production in 
factories, the firm’s tradition of focusing on short-term financial results made unions reluctant 
to sign the agreement (Helper & Henderson, 2014). 
Benevolence means that the firm integrates the welfare of (certain) stakeholders in its ob-
jective function. When the stakeholders are convinced that a firm is benevolent to them, it is 
more likely that they agree implicit contracts, providing relationship-specific resources and ef-
fort. For example, Southwest Airlines is well known for its ‘Employees Come First’ policy that 
includes a commitment to give them a stable work environment. Southwest has been one of the 
few airlines that refrained from reducing workforce in the aftermath of September 11 (Conlin, 
2001) or during the recessions of 2008 and 2009 (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). This commit-
ment can lead employees to attribute benevolence to the firm, which could explain Southwest’s 
excellence in quality of service (Prince & Simon, 2015), which mirrors employees’ effort.   
Implicit contracts are always ethically coloured, since they are promises, which are uni-
versally seen as morally binding (Scanlon, 1990). When promises are broken, the victims feel 
offended, even if the promises were not explicit (Butler, Giuliano, & Guiso, 2016). The fact 
that implicit contracts do not specify the obligations of parties emphasizes the importance of 
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good faith and reciprocity in interpreting whether the parties are honouring the contract (Bosse 
et al., 2009; Granovetter, 1985). Thus, a firm’s perceived integrity provides a reason to stake-
holders for expecting that the firm will want to fulfil implicit contracts. While the trust literature 
has understood integrity as largely co-extensive with ethical behaviour, implicit contracts in-
voke a more limited sense of integrity, i.e. keeping one’s word. This sense is closer to a philo-
sophical tradition that relates integrity to agents’ respect of centrally important commitments, 
rather than to moral virtues. Bernard Williams (1981) showed that integrity is in opposition to 
consequentialist reasoning and requires agents to act on their convictions even when they clash 
with personal benefit. Respecting promises out of integrity is also different than David Hume’s 
view that moral admiration for keeping one’s word is artificial and derives from the social ad-
vantages of exchanging promises (Anscombe, 1978). 
In the context of organizational trust, a firm’s perceived integrity provides a basis to stake-
holders for expecting that implicit contracts will be honoured in absence of economic interest. 
Conversely, the perception that a firm does not respect commitments will make stakeholders 
desist from entering implicit contracts with it or worry about the execution of contracts already 
in place. Volkswagen’s emission scandal in 2015 revealed that the firm was lying to customers 
about its cars’ emissions and had cheated regulators, violating basic business commitments. 
Almost immediately, concerns started to spread about the security of jobs in Volkswagen, 
which were protected by time-honoured implicit contracts between the firm, the unions, and 
the local authorities. Volkswagen’s controlling families had to reassure the public that they 
supported “the guaranteeing of jobs” (Vasagar, Milne, & Jackson, 2015). These concerns indi-
cate that, after the scandal exposed Volkswagen’s lack of integrity, it would have not come as 
a surprise to see the firm pass the buck onto workers (McGee & Campbell, 2016). 
 
3.3. How sustainability facilitates implicit contracts  
Sustainability requires firms to integrate social and environmental issues in their strategies, and 
use their resources, capabilities, and power in ways that respect the interests and the values of 
all involved constituencies. By being sustainable, a firm orients its business in the direction of 
global societal welfare, in presence of systemic association of firms with important issues, such 
as climate change or human rights, or recurring narratives in which firms are depicted as amoral 
and ready to cheat (Harris & Wicks, 2010). Therefore, firms that adopt sustainability distance 
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themselves from their less responsible peers and may elicit positive stakeholder attributions. 
Research has shown that stakeholders indeed associate pro-social firm attitudes to a higher de-
gree of trustworthiness (Homburg et al., 2013). In turn, trustworthiness should facilitate firms 
in entering implicit contracts; however, the role of sustainability is different in each of the three 
reasons for trusting the firm to honour these contracts. 
Sustainability and value of relationship. Stakeholders are often uncertain as to whether the 
firm is a patient type that values a continued relationship or an impatient type that aims at quick 
payoffs. Since impatient firms will try to disguise themselves as patient to enter implicit con-
tracts, firms that are actually patient must signal their type to stakeholders. A way for firms to 
demonstrate patience is to engage in activities that are profitable only in the long term, such as 
R&D investment, entry in new markets at an immature stage, or building resources with no 
clear short-term worth (Wang & Bansal, 2012). Sustainability can serve the same purpose be-
cause the social and environmental issues to be addressed by firms are usually long-term (e.g., 
climate change) and require a corresponding enduring effort (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 
2014). Therefore, firms that invest in sustainability display an intention to stay around all the 
time needed to reap the results of their effort. This long-term orientation implies that a sustain-
able firm will want to honour implicit contracts. 
In general, sustainability efforts that are perceived as driven by a firm’s self-interest – such 
as green investment based on public incentives – will not be good predictors of future firm 
behaviour, because self-interest depends on circumstances that change. Moreover, trust is more 
likely to develop when an action is attributed to internal factors, such as the values of the trustee, 
rather than external situations, such as business opportunities (Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; 
Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Therefore, targeting sustainability issues without direct connec-
tions to the core business of a firm, which is of little strategic value, may still help a firm enter 
implicit contracts, if these issues are linked to fundamental values of society. 
Sustainability and benevolence. Implicit contracts arise in open-ended relationships that 
give stakeholders the opportunity to experience the degree of care the firm has for them. Sus-
tainability efforts can drive attributions of benevolence when these efforts deliver what certain 
stakeholders perceive (not always accurately) as special treatment, e.g., volunteering initiatives 
that imply an interest in participating in the life of local communities, or a distinctive dedication 
to certain environmental issues. This is information that relevant stakeholders gather through 
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repeated interaction with the firm or observation of its activities, a circumstance that is condu-
cive to affective trust (McAllister, 1995). Moreover, human inclinations to personalism lead us 
to interpret the impact that others have on us as done on purpose (Jones & Davis, 1965). Sus-
tainability is especially likely to reinforce personalism and benevolence attributions when is 
based on responsiveness to stakeholder requests or directly engages stakeholders (Mena & 
Chabowski, 2015). 
Sustainability and integrity. Integrity is important because “one could collect plenty of 
evidence indicating that managers are quite capable of ignoring social concerns and breaching 
trust when doing so is in their own interest” (Holmstrom, 1988: 58). Assuming responsibility 
for social concerns means accepting basic rules of respect for the interests and values of others. 
Therefore, adopting sustainability implies a firm’s commitment to solve social and environ-
mental issues that are crucial for society, which supports attributions of integrity. A firm’s in-
tegrity relates to organizational procedures, internal culture, leadership style, and other deci-
sion-making mechanisms at the firm level (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Direct expe-
riences by a stakeholder with a firm are not sufficient to evaluate its integrity, because integrity 
is revealed by how the firm treats all stakeholders, and not only the stakeholder in question. 
Moreover, most stakeholders have to rely on second-hand sustainability information provided 
by firms, which may be interested in providing biased accounts (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015) 
and in publicizing adoption when it is only ceremonial (Lim & Tsutsui, 2011). Therefore, the 
interpretation of the motives behind sustainability activities – more normatively or more instru-
mentally oriented – is likely to figure prominently in the integrity attribution process (Donia & 
Tetrault Sirsly, 2016). 
To summarize, sustainability can signal that a firm has a long-term orientation and cause 
stakeholder attributions of benevolence and integrity, although the characteristics of the firm, 
the activities, the issues being addressed, and the nature of the information available to stake-
holders will act as boundary conditions on the production of these outcomes. Given that sus-
tainability has the potential to impact on the reasons to trust a firm when entering implicit con-
tracts, a further question to ask is how sustainability interacts with other variables that enter 
stakeholder calculations about the value of the relationship for the firm. Calculative and affec-
tive types of trust might be either complements or substitutes in facilitating implicit contracts 
(Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). As I examine in the next section, this question has important 
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implications about the degree to which firms will want to engage in sustainability in different 
situations. 
 
4. Implicit contracts as antecedents of sustainability adoption 
Firms vary in the degree to which they adopt sustainability. An implicit-contract perspective 
suggests that, given that sustainability facilitates implicit contracts, the degree of adoption of 
sustainability by a firm should be directly related to circumstances that make implicit contracts 
valuable, and inversely related to the strength of other factors that help the firm enter implicit 
contracts without adopting sustainability. 
In the following, I identify a number of (non-exhaustive) areas in which the implicit con-
tract perspective can explain variance in sustainability adoption. The discussion rests on two 
assumptions. First, I assume that sustainability is costly, because it absorbs resources that firms 
could deploy to other purposes, including managerial attention. Moreover, even when sustain-
ability is merely ceremonial, it exposes firms to backlash when stakeholders discover that adop-
tion has been less than substantial. As a consequence, in an implicit-contract perspective, a firm 
will restrain sustainability adoption when better substitutes are available. Second, I assume that 
sustainability is not the only means to demonstrate integrity and benevolence. For example, 
integrity can be upheld by well-oiled internal audit procedures that are part of a firm’s business 
as usual, rather than a commitment to sustainability. Similarly, benevolence can manifest in 
tacit no-layoff commitments that do not appear in formal statements or sustainability policies. 
1) Importance of implicit contracts in different industries. Industries vary in terms of the 
amount of relationship-specific capital invested by stakeholders, depending on technologies 
and characteristics of products and services. Industries also differ in the degree to which 
knowledge is codified rather than tacit, and to which the performance of workers, suppliers or 
other stakeholders is easy to measure rather than ambiguous. These differences at the industry 
level are associated with different propensities of firms to embrace relational approaches to 
stakeholders (Dyer & Singh, 1998). So, it seems reasonable to assume that higher sustainability 
adoption might be observed in industries in which such relational approaches are more com-
mon, because firms in these industries could find it critical to recur to implicit contracts. 
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Research about industry-level determinants of pro-social attitudes is relatively underde-
veloped (Short, McKenny, Ketchen, Snow, & Hult, 2016), but Siegel & Vitaliano (2007) pro-
vide evidence that firms that sell experience goods are more socially responsible than those that 
sell search goods. This evidence is in line with the prediction that industries that depend on 
relational approaches exhibit higher adoption of sustainability. Experience goods must be con-
sumed before the customer can determine their value (e.g., healthcare); search goods can be 
evaluated before purchase (e.g., apparel). Experience goods are promises, because customers 
have no legal protection against frustrating quality that stays within an acceptable range. Even 
when the first impression is positive, the costumer who makes repeat purchases must trust the 
producer to provide the same quality as before. Therefore, customer loyalty to experience goods 
is an implicit contract with the producer; firms in industries that produce these goods might be 
especially interested in being sustainable to demonstrate that they deserve this loyalty. 
2) Importance of implicit contracts in a firm’s strategy. Firms in the same industry vary in 
the degree to which they rely on implicit contracts. Firms that rely more might exhibit higher 
levels of sustainability than those that rely less, because they are more interested in the trust-
worthiness-enhancing properties of sustainability. In particular, one could expect a more inten-
sive use of sustainability that specifically aims at improving a firm’s trustworthiness, and not 
simply of those activities that fulfil extant implicit contracts. 
Luxury brands provide an illustration. These brands give customers a value that goes be-
yond the intrinsic quality of products, conveying exclusivity and prestige. Sustainability has no 
obvious associations with luxury; actually, the altruistic values of sustainability might harm the 
self-enhancement concept (dominance over people) that is intrinsic to luxury brands (Torelli, 
Monga, & Kaikati, 2012). “Sustainable luxury” can easily sound as an oxymoron. However, a 
luxury brand implicitly promises customers to preserve the intangible value of the product, by 
maintaining high standards and avoiding actions that may dilute the brand, such as cheap brand 
extensions. So, a long-term orientation is important to convince customers to pay the extra-
price applied to these products. The decades-long history of brands like Chanel or Gucci wit-
nesses this orientation. As a matter of fact, luxury companies have recently emerged as highly 
committed to sustainability and leaders in adopting new sustainability tools, such as Kering’s 
Environmental Profit & Loss account (Gröschl, Gabaldón, & Hahn, 2019). This commitment 
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suggests an effort by firms to present themselves to customers as a patient type that honours the 
implicit contract of luxury goods. 
3) Other signals of the value of relationship. Other things being equal, the implicit-contract 
perspective suggests that large firms should be less sustainable than small firms, because as 
previously noticed large firms draw larger streams of income from implicit contracts. These 
streams increase the value of the relationship and make sustainability superfluous if the firm 
wants to demonstrate trustworthiness. However, one should also consider that large firms have 
financial resources that make it relatively easy for them to exit implicit contracts. Therefore, 
large firms can be suspected of being prone to opportunism, which might provide a reason for 
these firms to adopt sustainability to reveal benevolence and integrity. A further complication 
is that large firms are visible targets that attract external pressures when they are not sustainable 
(Bartley & Child, 2014). 
A firm’s profitability can also be a signal of the value of relationship, even though its 
relationship with implicit contracts seems complex. On one hand, profitability concurs with 
firm size in providing resources that can be used to breach implicit contracts, creating a motive 
for investing in sustainability to reassure stakeholders. On the other hand, profitability signals 
that the firm is gaining from its implicit contracts and, therefore, it is not interested in breaching 
them, de-emphasizing the need to invest in sustainability. 
Firm age signals long-term orientation and makes sustainability less necessary, while 
young firms suffer from a liability of newness that they may try to mitigate through a pro-social 
attitude (Wang & Bansal, 2012). Any other firm characteristic or decision that implies a long-
term orientation should reduce the value of sustainability and be inversely related to its adop-
tion, but the effect can be confounded by concurrent mechanisms that go in the opposite direc-
tion. For example, family ownership is usually associated to a long-term orientation; however, 
family owners can derive affective value (so-called socioemotional wealth) from good relation-
ships with stakeholders (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010). Preliminary 
support for the implicit-contract perspective comes from evidence that indicates that family 
firms are more socially responsible than non-family firms toward external stakeholders, but 
they seem to neglect internal stakeholders, such as employees, who are more involved in im-
plicit contracts (Cruz, Larraza-Kintana, Garcés-Galdeano, & Berrone, 2014). 
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4) Having a highly salient stakeholder. Some firms depend on a particular stakeholder 
category, such as powerful suppliers with exclusive technologies, employees in professional or 
IT firms, or local governments in the extractive industry. When the relationship with these 
stakeholders is shaped by implicit contracts, a firm might choose to focus on demonstrating 
benevolence to these stakeholders, while displaying integrity or long-term orientation is less 
important. This situation could lead to lower sustainability effort, due to disregard for the other 
stakeholder categories.  
 
5. Conclusion 
An extensive literature has showed that implicit contracts allow firms to create value by en-
couraging relationship-specific investment and motivating effort by stakeholders. Moreover, 
implicit contracts give firms their social license to operate. Implicit contracts are commonly 
used both within the firm and in business relationships, due to complexities of contracting fu-
ture contingencies. Since implicit contracts are hard to build, they allow firms to achieve com-
petitive advantages over rivals that have an inferior capacity to recur to these contracts. Implicit 
contracts give stakeholder theory a way to propose a view of the firm – the nexus of explicit 
and implicit claims – that supports both normative and instrumental implications about sustain-
ability and pro-social attitudes. 
However, this view must be complemented by an understanding of how firms build trust-
worthiness, which is crucial to make implicit contracts feasible. Trust covers both calculative 
dimensions, related to the value of the relationship for the firm, and affective dimensions related 
to a firm’s integrity and benevolence. Sustainability contributes to implicit contracts not only 
by fulfilling them, but also by signalling a firm’s long-term orientation and its benevolence and 
integrity. I described four areas in which the interplay between industry characteristics, firm 
strategies, and different sources of firm trustworthiness can explain variance in sustainability 
adoption. In all the areas, I hinted at substitution effects between sustainability and other facil-
itators of implicit contracts. However, some complementarity is also possible. Consistency be-
tween factors (e.g., between adopting a long-term orientation and showing integrity) and among 
different domains of sustainability may contribute to positive reception of firms’ efforts (Wang 
& Choi, 2013). 
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Much must be done empirically to test the validity of the theories that I presented in this 
chapter. A first general issue is that firms engage in a variety of activities that are beneficial to 
stakeholders, but a large part of them do not appear in the ratings that researchers generally use 
to measure the social and environmental performance of a firm (Chatterji et al., 2016). There-
fore, the external validity of these ratings is to be disputed, especially if one wants to study pro-
social attitudes, and not adoption of a list of recommended practices. Relatedly, trust is situa-
tion-specific, because stakeholders will trust the firm to adopt a certain action in certain condi-
tions. Correspondingly, trust will relate to certain sustainability activities that stakeholders ex-
perience, observe, and to which they attach meanings within the complex relationship they have 
with the firm. A proper testing of the implicit-contract perspective requires a careful definition 
of what activities are expected to generate which reactions, given a general framework of trust-
worthiness in implicit contracts. My hope is that this chapter may lay the ground for further 
theoretical and empirical research on implicit contracts between firms and stakeholders. Given 
how pervasive implicit contracts are in business (and in everyday life), such research is likely 
to have numerous implications for our understanding of how organizations can productively 
contribute to sustainability. 
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